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9CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE STAGE: WHAT ARE SYSTEM INTEGRATORS
AND WHY MIGHT WE NEED THEM?
Motivation
As new technologies and innovations emerge, the engineering of products has become
progressively more complex. Engineering departments are also pushed to bring new products to
market at an ever-increasing pace, which requires program teams to work more efficiently.
Many companies find they no longer have the luxury of performing product development tasks
in series, and attempt to compress development time by working on tasks in parallel.
However, parallel development requires much more interaction amongst engineering groups and
an ability to deal with uncertainty since designs evolve simultaneously. If left unaddressed,
problems typically emerge at the interface of components or subsystems, not within the
components themselves. The interaction of components can no longer be passively observed as
an outcome, simply dealt with as problems emerge, but must be actively managed for companies
to succeed in launching well-functioning products on time and within budget.
Some firms are beginning to recognize the need for actively managing problematic interfaces
and have looked to systems engineers for the solution. One particular subset of systems
engineers, called System Integrators, are often introduced to manage the interface issues that
have arisen with the increasingly difficult task of concurrently engineering complex products.
Yet, how a company can identify, develop, and deploy System Integrators to accomplish this
task is poorly understood.
Thesis Statement
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a roadmap for how a component-focused engineering
company can effectively introduce system integrators in their organization. To this end, the
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question of how to analytically identify the necessary skills and characteristics of an ideal system
integrator will be addressed.
In this thesis, it is assumed that a company is currently component-focused and trying to migrate
towards system-focused product development, or that previous efforts to transition to systems
thinking have not yet been effective. It is also assumed that there are system-level issues that
have emerged in current or past products, such that a need for System Integrators (SIs) is
recognized. This thesis will not address the issue of how a company determines whether or not
SIs are required for their organization, but will help companies effectively identify, develop, and
deploy SIs given that they are needed. In other words, a framework that outlines the necessary
elements for successful introduction and sustainment of SIs will be developed. These key
elements contain both technical and organizational/cultural aspects, providing a holistic approach
to the institutionalization of SIs.
The Value of Systems Engineering
To understand what exactly an SI can do for an organization, we must first understand the value
of systems engineering as a whole. So what exactly is systems engineering? After much debate,
the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Fellows reached a consensus on the
following definition for systems engineering:
Systems engineering is an engineering discipline whose responsibility is creating
and executing an interdisciplinary process to ensure that the customer and
stakeholder's needs are satisfied in a high quality, trustworthy, cost efficient and
schedule compliant manner throughout a system's entire life.
But what exactly comprises a system? Depending on your scope, one could talk about a car's
engine as a system of components that work together and deliver kinetic energy in the form of
rotational energy. If you work at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSE),
your definition of a system might be the environment in which a car functions. This might
include the infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, guard rails), vehicles, and people either inside or in
proximity of moving vehicles. For NHTSE, a car is simply one subsystem, comprised of smaller
subsystems like seat belts, airbags, roll-over curtains, front and rear crush zones, and occupants
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of all ages/sizes and seating positions. Needless to say, a system is as big or as small as you
demarcate it, but what is true for all systems, and thereby defines it is that:
A system is a construct of collection of different elements that together produce
results not obtainable by the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include
people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and documents; that is, all things
required to produce systems-level results. The results include system level
qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, behavior and performance. The
value added by the system as a whole, beyond that contributed independently by
the parts, is primarily created by the relationship among the parts; that is, how
they are interconnected. (INCOSE definition of systems, and this references
Rechtin 2000)
Thus, the value of systems engineering is in the delivery of a working system and its associated
functions or benefits. Every system has its own particular delivered value that the components
alone cannot provide. It is only through their interactions that components can deliver the
ultimate value of the system, and systems engineers are tasked with its delivery.
Systems Engineers vs. System Integrators
Systems engineering, by its very nature of being so interdisciplinary and multifaceted, is quite
broad. In fact, INCOSE members have spent many hours, weeks, and even years debating what
exactly is and is not systems engineering. A paper by Sheard [1996] clearly differentiated 12
distinct roles that systems engineers often assume, either independently or as a collection of
many. One role described by Sheard is that of the "requirements owner", whereby they are
responsible for translating customer needs into component design/function requirements.
The task for systems integrators falls mainly within another of the 12 categories identified by
Sheard, namely the "glue" role. As defined by Sheard, the glue, or systems integrator, serves as:
... a proactive troubleshooter, looking for problems and arranging to prevent them.
Since many problems happen at interfaces, this role involves a very close scrutiny
of interfaces, particularly internal, subsystem-to-subsystem interfaces. While the
designers of the subsystems struggle to make their subsystems do what they are
supposed to, the ["glue"] systems engineer is watching to ensure that each
subsystem is not going to interfere with the others:.... In the [glue] role, systems
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engineers need wide experience, meaningful domain knowledge, and an interest
in continuous learning to stay a step ahead of problems ...
In a separate article, Sheard indicates that the system integrator "is primarily valuable in regard
to what problems it prevents" (Sheard, 1996). Regrettably, it is difficult to quantify the
fiduciary benefits of problems averted, which can make it difficult to justify up-front. However,
the cost of not having them is painfully clear when interface issues emerge on large-scale
products that increase costs and/or delay product introduction.
In summary, system integrators (SIs) typically focus on managing the interface of components
and/or subsystems. They are responsible for integrating the components/subsystems to deliver
the system level functions/attributes. SIs ultimately ensure that the system is optimized, not just
the components/subsystems, and frequently they must ensure that the component/subsystem
engineers work together in order to deliver an optimized system.
SIs: Development and Deployment
In my efforts to understand how you can develop system integrators, it became clear that there
was a more fundamental question that had to be answered: What are the skills and/or aptitudes
of the ideal system integrator? One must first understand the destination before a plan to get
there can be devised.
Knowing that all systems and their interfacing components/subsystems are unique, it is
impossible to specifically identify the exact knowledge required of an SI regardless of their field.
For instance, an SI working in the automotive industry would require different skills than an SI
in the aerospace industry. There are general skills that can be listed, and they are further
discussed in chapter 3, however, these skills do not help a particular company determine which
person in their organization can likely perform the job better than anyone else. Organizations
need a more precise and analytical approach to defining the skills required of their systems
integrators, especially during the initial deployment when it is questionable whether or not the
role will stick. It always requires more focus, more direction, and more strength to be a pioneer
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of a new way of thinking, and that' s the difficulty of introducing systems engineers into a
component-focused organization.
Once you understand the specific skills and aptitudes required of an ideal system integrator, the
task of developing selected employees is simply a matter of filling in the gaps. However, can the
deficiency be spanned with education or is on-the-job training/experience required? Do SIs need
depth or breadth, and if so, in what areas and to what extent? And how exactly does the position
fit in one's career path? Is the SI position a final destination where employees aspire to stay or is
it a stepping stone to other engineering or management positions? These questions will be
discussed in subsequent chapters.
Finally, the question of how an organization can successfully introduce and sustain system
integrators will be discussed. What exactly must happen in order for the SIs to be effective?
What, if any, preparatory work needs to be done before you deploy SIs in a program? Do they
just need to "jump in" and learn as they go, or is there a more tactical approach? What, if
anything, needs to be in place before you introduce SIs, if your goal is to have them be effective
as soon as possible? What organizational support systems are necessary to sustain the efficacy
of SIs?
The intent of this thesis is to answer these questions.
A Case Study
A Fortune 100 company that is currently introducing System Integrators was examined as a case
study with the intent of giving specific examples of how to apply the roadmap and give
recommendations on how the company could more effectively utilize their SIs.
This Fortune 100 corporation, The Alpha Company, recognized their need for system
integrators due to recurring system-level issues that emerged during product launches. No one
individual was responsible for the system, thus making it difficult to resolve the problem
* The Alpha Company is a fictitious name for a real company. Its real name has been omitted to maintain its
anonymity.
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effectively and efficiently. Furthermore, no one was responsible for preventing similar system-
level issues from emerging on future product launches. Employees became somewhat
desensitized to these system issues, believing that they were inevitable problems during new
product launches. With increased focus on cost, as well as management's drive for flawless
execution, it was determined that system integrators should be given the responsibility of
delivering the system-level functions that would efficiently improve the product's quality. A
complete presentation of why and how Alpha decided to select, develop, and deploy System
Integrators will be given in Chapter 2. Analysis of how Alpha could have been more successful
in doing so will be given in Chapter 3. Final conclusions and recommendations on how to
effectively develop and deploy system integrators in any component-based engineering
organization will be given in Chapter 4.
Research Methods
I was fortunate enough to be involved with Alpha's introduction of system integrators from the
beginning. Three months after upper management decided to create the system integrator
position, I started to interview affected employees. A representative selection of employees at all
levels within the organization was identified. Interviews were strictly confidential and typically
1 hour in length, but occasionally varied from 30 - 120 minutes as appropriate and/or necessary.
A specified set of questions were asked, however, each interview was tailored to obtain relevant
information given the person's current and past work experiences.
Interviews began with a brief description of the interviewee's past and present work experiences
and then specific questions pertaining to the system integrator role were asked. All interviewees
were asked to define what they envisioned for the system integrator's role, both in manufacturing
and engineering. Additional questions that were typically asked are as follows:
· How would you define a systems engineer? A system integrator?
* Is there a need within the Alpha Company for System Integrators or System
Engineers?
* What skills do you think would be required for an SI to be effective?
* What do you see as the biggest challenges a Systems Integrator will/does face?
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Three rounds of interviews were held over the course of 11 months. The first round of
interviews occurred in August & September of 2003, for a total of 27 interviews. The second
round of 32 interviews was completed in January 2004, while the final round of 26 interviews
was conducted in May & June of 2004. A grand total of 85 interviews were conducted with 65
individuals. Typically, the System Integrators and their managers were interviewed twice over
the course of 11 months to document any changes in the System Integrator's role and
effectiveness over time.
A breakdown of the 65 people interviewed is given below:
By division:
40 individuals from engineering
25 individuals from manufacturing
By position within their respective divisions (in hierarchical order):
2 upper level managers
9 chiefs
19 managers
16 supervisors
15 System Integrators
4 general employees
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CHAPTER 2
CASE STUDY: ALPHA INTRODUCES SYSTEM
INTEGRATORS
The following case study is presented as an example of a large, component-based automotive
company trying to embrace systems thinking. Their efforts to appoint and deploy system
integrators within a smaller system will be reviewed and evaluated for effectiveness. Alternative
approaches that would have been more effective will be explored in Chapter 3. To preserve their
anonymity, this Fortune 100 automotive company will be referred to as the Alpha Company.
Recognition of Need at Alpha Company
In June of 2003, Alpha's upper management in manufacturing and engineering noticed that a
primary source of customer dissatisfaction across vehicles in every division was windnoise.
They also noticed that other issues related to side doors, like closing efforts and/or water leaks,
continued to emerge during new product launches regardless of prior efforts to solve these
systemic problems. Upper management acknowledged that,
... windnoise, water leaks, door closing efforts and various and sundry other
attributes of doors have plagued us for a long, long time. Windnoise is the
number one producer of customer dissatisfaction and it's absolutely systemic.
It's a problem across all vehicle platforms, the dealers can't solve it, and it's
endemic.
They also noticed that there was no one person or group of people who were responsible for a
door system's performance. One of them explained, "no one is responsible for doors. And quite
frankly, I'm not really responsible for doors, but maybe [my boss who oversees all
manufacturing and engineering operations in North America] is the first guy who's responsible
for doors, and that doesn't seem to be right."
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The Alpha Company's Organizational Structure
Within North American Operations, there were two separate divisions which directly supported
product development: Engineering and Manufacturing (see Figure it).
Figure 1: Alpha's High level organization chart (simplified to maintain anonymity)
Within both the engineering and manufacturing divisions, there were 4 Product Groups where
vehicles of similar sizes or platforms were lumped together. These 4 Product Groups were
t The organizational chart has been simplified to maintain Alpha's anonymity, but is still representative of their
structure.
[ CEO of Alpha Company
..........
- -a
-- --- - --- - - :
, . ... ... ...
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relatively independent since the commonality between a sports car and a passenger van is
minimal. Given that these product groups were discrete, they were more appropriately grouped
as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Alpha Company Product Groups, with separate Engineering teams (depicted in Figure
3) and Manufacturing teams shown in each Product Group.
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Figure 3: Engineering Divisions within Each Product Group
Figure 3 depicts the engineering divisions in each Product Group, which consisted of Body,
Powertrain, Chassis, Electrical, and Vehicle Engineering. Within the Body Engineering Division
in each Product Group, there were 4 separate departments: Exterior Systems, Interior Systems,
Closures, and Body Structures. As recently as 2001, Closures was created as a unique
department within Body Engineering, responsible for side doors and rear
decklids/tailgates/liftgates. Previously, the closure component responsibilities were embedded in
the other three departments.
Detailed information regarding typical engineering responsibilities for components within Body
Engineering is given below in Figure 4.
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Each Closures Department had approximately 30 employees (1 manager, 5-7 supervisors, and
20-25 engineers). The Product Groups were not identically structured, but had a common scope
that included engineering responsibilities for side doors and liftgates/tailgates/decklids. The
closures department was typically organized as follows:
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Manager, Closures Engineering Department
5 engineers 5 engineers
Supervisor,
Side Door
Moveable
Glass
3 engineers 3 engineers
Supervisor, Supervisor,
Liftgate, Special
Decklid Projects
Systems
4 engineers
Figure 5: Organization Chart of a typical Closures Department
Given the organizational structure at Alpha, there were a total of 4 Closures Departments within
the engineering division, one for each Product Group. These Product Groups were relatively
independent of each other, with some conversation at the manager level and little conversation at
the engineering level.
Between August 2003 and August 2004, additional component design responsibilities were
pulled into most Closures Departments, namely interior door trim panels and outer side mirrors.
The electrical systems within the door, as well as the speakers, remained within the electrical
department to maintain the integrity of the vehicle's electrical system. Single points of contact
within the electrical department were identified as the primary interface for system integrators in
an effort to reduce the organizational gap.
Understanding the Need at Alpha
Delivering the target values for closure systems attributes were consistently a problem at launch
and much time was spent in the last few months of the design process trying to bridge the gap
Supervisor, Supervisor,
Side Door Side Door
Sheet Hardware
Metal
Supervisor,
Side Door
Dynamic
Sealing
I I i I I I
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between the prototype's system-level attribute performance and the target values. However, it is
a difficult balance, where improvement of one attribute can result in the deterioration of another.
For example, windnoise performance and closing efforts of a door often have an inverse
relationship. To prevent windnoise, an interference fit of the seals between the door and the
vehicle is required - the seal should be compressed to ensure air cannot enter between the door
and the vehicle body. However, an interference fit requires pressure on the seal, and this
increases closing efforts. High closing efforts result in doors not closing completely when
someone casually shuts the door, which translates into annoyed customers. One functional
engineer in Closures explained that even independent of one another, they are complex attributes
to deliver, but are a great opportunity to improve customer satisfaction across multiple car lines
if addressed properly:
We fight [windnoise and closing efforts] every single day, every place. And both
of those are really complex issues that span across, again, all of [the functional
engineering groups within closures. We all] get involved in those things [but]
none of [us] take the lead.
Balancing the attributes of a door is technically difficult as demonstrated by the sheer fact that it
has continued to be a problem on every vehicle for many years. Since no one has been
responsible for managing these attributes, it is understandable that these issues have been
systemic.
Upper management wanted to address the largest contributor to customer dissatisfaction, and
thought that introducing system engineers who would be responsible for the delivery of a door
system, including the design and manufacturing thereof, would be the best solution.
However, in the Alpha organization, the engineering division is held responsible for the design
of vehicles while the manufacturing division is held responsible for making components and
building vehicles. These two divisions are very independent and it is only at 1 level below the
president/CEO that the two divisions share the same boss. This lack of integration between
engineering and manufacturing complicates efforts to create a door systems engineering group as
they envisioned. Even the definition of "engineering" at Alpha refers to the up-front product
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development work, not necessarily engineering work performed in the manufacturing
environment.
Unfortunately, Alpha's problems with delivering an optimized door system does not solely stem
from a lack of integration between engineering and manufacturing. There is also a lack of
integration within the divisions. For instance, engineers have component-level responsibilities,
like a door's sheet metal, window regulator, locks & mechanisms, interior trim, weather seals,
body side sheet metal, etc. Due to the component-level focus, previous efforts to address system
level attributes like windnoise, door closing efforts, and water leaks, have occurred only at the
component level and have generally been unsuccessful. Understandably, it is impossible to
optimally solve a system issue when you only consider the modification of one component.
However, it is not a trivial task to change the mindset from component to system-level
responsibilities. Management concurred that, "we are a culture based on components, not a
culture of systems thinking".
The lack of integration internal to the engineering and the manufacturing divisions is also
apparent in that neither side has optimized its own system. While they have not optimized either
the complete design or complete manufacturing process of the closure system, individual
components or subsystems are frequently optimized. But optimized parts do not join together to
make an optimized whole. An employee acknowledged that:
When you look at our designs, the first thing you see is that [if you take] the
design of the door opening [panel], the door, and the seal, and [you] do a
min/max stack of tolerances, they don't fit [together]. And you ask why or
who's responsible and no one is responsible. Then you go see if parts meet
manufacturing drawings and they don't. We see we don't put the parts together
as designed as we should, and then fitters have pieces of wood in plants trying
to make doors fit... and no one [engineer is ultimately] responsible for doors.
Upper management recognized the chasm between the two divisions, agreeing that, "the
[manufacturing] guys ... argue that the design isn't correct, and they're right. And design guys
say it would work if the manufacturing guys would just make the parts like they should and they
don't. So it's a circular argument." Given the strong independence of manufacturing and
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engineering, coupled with a lack of responsibility for the delivery of a door's system-level
attributes, it is understandable that delivery of robust closure systems has historically posed a
problem for Alpha.
Upper management also realized that the system level issues associated with closures could not
be effectively solved exclusively within the engineering or manufacturing realm. Instead, it
would require a partnership between the two traditionally independent organizations. However,
it was acknowledged that virtually no one within the Alpha Company had experience in both
divisions. Therefore, they decided that each division should have its own system engineers (later
called "system integrators", or SIs) to represent the best interests of their particular division and
these two SIs should work together on a program to deliver a robust closures system. The vision
was that the closures system integrators are a pilot group at Alpha. If the SIs prove successful at
delivering system-level functions/attributes, then other portions of the vehicle will be pulled into
their own system, with a single integration group above all others at the vehicle level.
Existing System Engineering Efforts at Alpha
As shown in Figure 3, there was a system engineering group responsible for the entire vehicle:
Vehicle Engineering. They were responsible for delivering the vehicle-level attributes and
functions. However, the Vehicle Engineering division was generally staffed by program
management individuals who did not have technical depth in component or subsystem design.
Therefore, they did not actively get involved with resolution of system-level issues other than to
track their progress and facilitate resolution as required. There were two exceptions to this
generalization. One is the vehicle dynamics group who were technically involved in the ride and
handling characteristics of the vehicle, but they did not interface with the Closures Department.
The second is the vehicle safety group but they were not concerned with non-safety issues like
closing efforts, water sealing and windnoise performance of the vehicle. Even if the Vehicle
Engineering division was technically involved in the system-level tradeoffs for a vehicle's
performance, it is unlikely that they would be involved in optimizing the door system, since it is
only a subsystem of the entire vehicle. Additionally, the engineering authority resided within the
Closures Department, and Vehicle Engineering is considered an outside organization. Therefore,
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the Vehicle Engineering division would not have had the ability to effectively drive
modifications in the design of the components.
Introduction of System Integrators at Alpha
For the purposes of this case study, explanation of the System Integrators' introduction at Alpha
will focus exclusively on the engineering division which took the initial lead in introducing SIs.
While the manufacturing organization embarked on a parallel process, they have particular
organizational and cultural complexities that are beyond the scope of this thesis. That being said,
the two organizations have much in common and the insights gained within the engineering
organization can still be applied to the manufacturing organization.
In August 2003, upper management in engineering tasked the closures managers to define the
roles and responsibilities (R&Rs) of the system integrator position. One manager took on the
responsibility of creating three proposals for a revised Closures Department organizational
structure and the R&Rs of the SI. One proposal was a complete overhaul of the organization,
centering it around systems. The second was a minimalist approach with few changes to people
or the organization. The third plan was the middle ground between the first two, where the
organization changed slightly to accommodate a new role that was systems-focused.
The manager reviewed the 3 proposals with the other managers for additional input before
presenting the options to his VP. The VP chose the third plan which was more of a middle
ground, allotting 9 SIs in engineering to support future model launch programs. These SIs would
work in a particular Product Group under the closures manager and be at the same authority level
as the functional supervisors (e.g. Side Door Sheet Metal Supervisor, Side Door Dynamic
Sealing Supervisor, etc, as shown in Figure 5). The vision deemed that even though the SIs
would be at the same hierarchical level, they would be the "first among equals" with the closures
functional supervisors. The SIs would have the final say in any matter where system level
performance was at stake.
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In November and December of 2003, two kick-off meetings were held with the SIs, middle
managers, and upper managers. These skip level meetings encompassed 4 levels of
management, and were primarily focused on creating and clarifying the roles and responsibilities
of the SIs. Additionally, any impediments to the SI's introduction were discussed, as well as
potential enablers for resolution. Initially, there were only a few SIs, but as time went on, the
closures managers were able to fill the remaining open positions.
In November 2003, the SIs, along with their management, finalized the following list of "guiding
principles" for their work on all new door designs:
Figure 6: Guiding Principles for SIs
Guiding Principles:
For all NEW door designs:
1) The door systems integrator (SI) is responsible for everything associated with the door
except institutional learning/standards/best practices.
2) The SI is " st among equals" in relation to the door component supervisors (whether they
are body or non-body supervisors such as electrical) and reports directly to the closures
manager.
3) All door component supervisors and engineers as well as door manufacturing supervisors
and engineers are responsible to support the SI toward an end goal of an optimized door
design with a successful launch.
4) There will be a single point of contact for each SI within manufacturing that supports the
SI on all manufacturing needs for the program.
5) Both the SI and the single point of contact in manufacturing must sign off the door
program prior to its approval at each gateway.
6) The SI (and his/her program) will not be a "victim" of broad policy decisions made by
purchasing, corporate design, complexity reduction or others if those policies drive
toward a sub-optimal door design. The SI will elevate these issues quickly in the same
way the Chief Engineer challenges these types of policies on a vehicle program.
7) Standards for design and manufacturing will be met or changed (no deviations).
8) There will be a single, consistent process for [engineering] in door development and
prove-out used by all door departments.
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Informational Cascades
In early January 2004, engineering's upper management held departmental meetings where the
need for SIs and their particular role in the product development process was discussed. It was
also clearly stated how robustly delivering the closures system translated into increased customer
satisfaction and revenue for the corporation. People at all levels of the organization were invited
to attend, and the fact that the VPs chaired the meeting gave the new SI role instant credibility.
It was clearly understood that upper level management was fully behind the system integration
initiative. After these meetings, the role of the SI was better understood within the organization
and SIs no longer had to spend as much time explaining who they were and what they were
trying to accomplish.
SI Selection at Alpha
No formalized process was used in the selection of a Product Group's system integrators. Each
Product Group had the autonomy to appoint their own SIs, and each had its own idea about the
criteria for the most effective system integrator. After interviewing each closures manager
separately, it became clear that the general consensus amongst them was that SIs should have
design experience in one or more closure components, have good communication skills, and be
strong leaders. However, the managers' specific perceptions varied, and are detailed below.
One manager indicated that his ideal candidate for the System Integrator position would have the
following skills/characteristics, but conceded that "it will be hard, if not impossible", to find
someone with everything listed:
* Solid background in designing closures
* Experience in vehicle engineering, specifically with windnoise attributes and how
they are cascaded into component requirements
* Manufacturing experience so they can understand their constraints
* Strong leadership - can't be afraid to fail
* Understand the Alpha culture and what it takes to "make the case for change, how to
energize people to get something for tomorrow instead of today"
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* Know how to get data, use data, and present the data to convince others how to
proceed
* Strong intellectual abilities - someone who is "intellectually capable of managing 2
thoughts in their brain at the same time. They have to be able to operate in a matrix
system and deal with a certain amount of ambiguity because there will be lots of it."
* Someone willing to "go get the truth" - to be able to explain failure when it happens.
To "not sweep problems under the rug to obtain the next promotion."
A second manager selected their SIs based on their ability to see "the big picture" and to make
trade-offs in order to optimize the system. The SI' s job "takes not only technical competency,
but leadership skills. ... [The SI] needs to be capable... needs to be willing to make decisions."
They also must be a "self-starter because the job is not well-defined." Additionally, the SI needs
to have:
"good personal skills, and needs to be comfortable not making all the decisions
about everything. It takes the right kind of person to admit they don't have all
the knowledge to make decisions, and they need people skills so that other
supervisors will work with them."
Finally, this manager felt that the SI needs to "pull all [the subsystems] together and make
decisions that are best for the organization."
The third manager identified the attributes of an SI as someone who has:
· 5-7 years of experience in closures engineering activities
* significant launch experience and/or plant experience
* strong "drive for results"
* strong leadership abilities in order to make the difficult trade-offs to optimize the
system
* strong 6-sigma discipline
* experience with windnoise issues and their resolution
Many of the items identified above are consistent with those iterated by the first two managers,
but with a slightly different emphasis on the 6 sigma discipline.
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The fourth manager had a shorter list of criteria for his SIs:
· experienced several launches
* Broad product development experience within closures
* Strong leadership skills
* Strong "drive for results"
* Good communication skills
Clearly, the closures managers had varying levels of standards for their SIs, but there is at least a
consensus on the need for experience, leadership, and communication skills. However, the
variations are notable. One manager believed manufacturing experience was necessary while
another emphasized a 6 sigma discipline. Only one manager felt that the SI must be able to "see
the big picture". It also appears that the clarity or depth of the manager's response reflected their
buy-in and commitment to systems engineering at Alpha.
Further discussion on what other industries deem necessary skills for their system engineers will
be reviewed in Chapter 3.
System Integrators' Roles & Responsibilities
As stated previously, each Product Group appointed their own SIs to work on specific future
model programs. Per the request of upper level management, the mid-level managers delineated
an initial list of roles and responsibilities for the SIs and functional supervisors in their
departments. Afterwards, the integrators helped refine the R&Rs as necessary and appropriate.
The meetings held with upper management in the fall of 2003 also reviewed the R&Rs.
Given that Alpha had previously used the RASICI model to list the roles and responsibilities of
certain positions, they decided to use it again to describe the R&Rs for the new SI position.
I RASIC is an acronym that determines the level of responsibilities of each party involved in a given list of tasks. The acronym: R =
Responsible, A = Approves, S = Supports, I = is Informed, C = is Consulted. For a certain task, an individual will be given a degree of
responsibility, represented by one of the letters in RASIC. Alpha tailored this approach for their purposes, calling it the URASIC model, adding
U for Ultimately Responsible. For more information on the RASIC model, see A.T. Kearney's article, Waging War on Complexity, 2002. It can
be found on the web at: http:// avw. atkearne.com/shared res/ndf Waging war on complexity S.ndf
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The finalized list shown in Figure 7 was completed in the skip-level meetings held in the fall of
2003, which included all levels of management between the SIs and the VPs. In Figure 7, notice
that the functional supervisors are responsible for the program deliverables through all stages of
product development, while the SI is "ultimately responsible" for the same items.
Many SIs responded to the R&Rs with excitement at having enough responsibility to make a real
difference for the customer, but also with a touch of exasperation since they were only 1 person
with no direct reports. In the summer of 2004, a handful of SEs and other engineering and
design people were assigned to work for SIs.
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Responsibilities of SIs and Functional Spvr.s within the Closures Department
Program Strategies I Business Requirements
Finance (Variable, Investment)
Program Assumptions - Content & Functionalit
Program Timing
Vehicle positioning in market and Competitive Set
Model Differentiation Strategy
Reusability & Shared Platform Strategy
Manufacturing Strategies
Sourcing Strategy - Suppliers I Timing
Engineering Statement of Work
Door/Seal/Hinge&Check/Latch Architecture
Requirements Compliance Plan
Manufacturing Labor Strategy - Modularity Content
Weight Target - System/component
Quality Targets
BOM - Pro ram Parts List
System Attribute Performance
Target Cascade (Veh/Sys/Sub-sys/Component)
Vehicle level Reqmts
Interior Sound Level - Contribution Targets
Operating Efforts - Opening/Closing
Sound Quality - Opening/Closing
Waterleaks Dust entry /I Air Leakage
Water Management
Squeak & Rattle
Crash Safety Performance
Durability
Corrosion
Mfg./Asy. Strategies & Requirements
Process and Strategy
Locators - reqmts., Strategy
Process Tolerance Strategy
Material / Stamping process strategy
Mfg. Asy. Strategy
Sheetmetal Crowns/Sweeps/radii regmts
Stamping Formability
Design Variation Analysis
Labor Allocation / Sequencing
Manufacturin CostStudies
Vehicle Architecture (Package Ergonomics)
Occupant Package
Ergo Zones
Ingress/Egress
Mirror Pkg & Location, Min. size
Electrical Architecture (Spkrs./Harnesses/Keypad)
Side Impact Zones/Foam & Intrusion Beam Parameters
Switch Locations/Arm Rest/Pull Handle Package
Closures
Systems
Integrator (SI)
U
(U = Ultimately
Responsible)
U
U
U
U
U
Closures
Functional
Supervisors
R
(R=
Responsible)
R
U
R
R
R
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Fit and Finish Craftsmanship
Craftsmanship Regmts - Margin/Flushness/Radii
Parameter Layouts (Environmental Drawings)
Mfg. Input on parting lines U R
Overlap/Shingling execution
Design Interference/Cheat
Color/Gloss/Grain Strategy & Execution
Closures Construction / CAD Development
Construction Section Development
Checkpoint Deliverables
PDN Compliance & Prototype Release
Material Specs. & Thicknesses
A/B/J Lines, Hinge&Check/Latch Pkg.
Stamping Assessment (draw depth, hndl pocket)
Cutline Zones/Swing Studies/Glass Drop
Interior Storage (Door Trim)
Sealing/Glass Run/Belt/Applique Parameters
Int. Trim/O/S Mirror Parameters U R
CAE Analysis - door cheat, forming simulation
DentLding & Stone Pecking Protection
O/S & I/S Release Handle Pkg/Efforts
Door Module pkg. & Loading
SpeakerNVire Harness/Keypad - Pkg/Attachments
Attachment holes/Pass-thru holes
Locators/SC-CC's selection
Std. Parts/Fasteners&TorquestAdhesivesh- IL Files
Loading Studies /Assembly Clearances
Serviceability
Design Disciplines I Verification
DFMEA / PFMEA's
Compatability Reviews - Virtual Builds
Test Plan - Veh/Sys/Component Level
Control Plans - SCCC's
Attribute Audit Plan (seal gaps/efforts/margins/flushness) U R
Design Verification- Veh./Buck/Component Testing
Analytical Signoff for CAE
Mfg./Asy. Process Sheet Signoff
Exterior Surface Verification Models
Rapid PrototvDes/Models for 3D compatibility
Veh. Build Support
Change Control
Internal Audit Performance - Issue Resolution U R
High-lmpact Supplier Readiness Reviews
Guaranteed parts Timing (Part buyoffs)
Figure 7: Responsibility Matrix
33
System Integrators' Tech Club
While SIs were each assigned to specific future product development programs within one of the
4 Product Groups, they held weekly meetings for all SIs to share their lessons learned across the
Product Groups. The meeting was informally called the SI Tech Club, with representation from
both the engineering and manufacturing SIs. The intent was to promote the advancement of
knowledge of all SIs, encouraging the documentation of improved processes and lessons learned.
Given that this was a new position, SIs were creating new processes and could advance their
learning more quickly by pooling their knowledge together.
The official charter, completed in February 2004, gave the following Statement of Scope and
Objectives:
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Statement of Scope
. To develop a systems engineering based process for the development of closures founded on
engineering-manufacturing cooperation.
· To improve the delivery of closures for new programs with improved quality, and customer
satisfaction.
· To develop technical excellence in the Closures Systems community.
· To share across Product Groups the Best-In-Class practices in closures and to develop and
implement improvements to the current practices/processes.
· To drive the implementation of standards.
Objectives
Develop Technical Excellence:
* Develop and advance the technical competencies of the core group of closures systems engineers.
Provide career development opportunities in line with TMM for closures systems community.
Technology Advancement and Process Improvement:
* Tool Set & Product Creation Process
* Identify, document and implement a single, consistent closures product creation process
* Identify and prioritize gaps in current product creation process (Speed, quality and cost) and initiate
process improvements to address
* Institutionalize / standardize tool sets, processes, and best practices
Standards:
* Implement and execute product and manufacturing standards.
Exchange information on a weekly basis covering a variety of topics, including:
* Review and approve strategies a Value Stream Mapping
· Advanced Project Work * Best In Class Processes
· Review and approve standards * New Technology Development
· Supplier Methods, Capabilities and Needs Outside speakers and Subject Matter
* Six Sigma Projects Experts
· Product Quality Improvements
Longer Term Objectives
Develop the training for Closures Systems Engineers
* Systems / Attribute Engineering
* Design/ Manufacturing and other tradeoffs
To share systems engineering learning/experience with other groups in Alpha.
Figure 8: SI Tech Club Charter
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While advancements have been made over the first year of implementation to satisfy these goals,
they have been discrete items focusing on a particular event in the development process on a
particular vehicle. In many respects, they focus more on developing checklists than developing
processes. To date, some of the SI Tech Club' s accomplishments have included:
· Design check sheet for SIs to use prior to prototype parts being shipped to a build event
* Design check sheet for prototype door signoff
* Compatibility review process updated
* Door closing velocity and efforts check control plan for prototype builds
* Individual product enhancements
Unfortunately, SIs have had several demands on their time and attendance at these weekly
meetings has been sporadic. The reality of the situation was that program specific needs
superseded the larger scale, system-level deliverables of the SI Tech Club. The Tech Club was
conceptually supported by the closures managers, but the primary deliverable for the engineering
division was the delivery of products. In effect, the SIs and the functional supervisors shared the
same primary goal because they reported directly to a closures manager. While the creation of a
system-based process was thought by many to be a better approach, the immediate demands of
product delivery have not changed. Therefore, there was little time to step back and create a
system approach to product development. But this does not mean that no progress was made.
Anecdote
When Alpha introduced SIs into the closures divisions, there were some success stories of how
SIs were able to resolve system-level issues associated with the doors. Additionally, program
managers have appreciated the presence of SIs, noting that now they know who to contact when
an issue pertaining to doors arises.
SIs agree that they are able to resolve issues that would historically emerge during the prototype
or launch phase months ahead of time, thereby saving money and improving quality. An
engineer gave the following example of an SI's success story resolving an interface issue:
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... [For example, the SI] got involved in the [driver's side, exterior] key pad
packaging of [program 6]. Nobody really takes the lead in that, because the
door sheet metal guy says, "Well, just tell me where to put the hole." And the
Packaging Group says, "We don't package things locally within the door. You
guys just handle it on your own." The wiring guys say, "Just tell us where to
put the wire." Everybody is, "Just tell us what to do, and we'll do it." And
nobody can really step up and take the lead in that, and then balance the
tradeoffs that need to happen in terms of package clearances, [and] the
ergonomic service for the other thing.
So, to me, that was a good example [of an SI] being able to step up and do the
true systems interaction and take the lead and drive it-- with recommendations
and come up with an equitable solution that probably wasn't the optimal for
each individual, but for the system it was the best approach. ... [Without an
integrator,] it would have been a disaster, and ... they [would not have seen it
until either the prototype build event or] launch. ... and [then] it would really
be expensive and high risk.
Such examples of SIs being able to deliver value to the programs reinforced the importance of
their role and helped others see the value of their work.
Organizational Views of SI Implementation
Over the course of one year from initial SI implementation, people's views of the role and its
effectiveness changed significantly. In August and September, 2003, those who were aware of
the SI position and its goals were generally optimistic, recognizing the need for someone to
oversee the system's performance. There was some skepticism pertaining to changing such a
large organization, but the positive perceptions were stronger. By January 2004, people were
less optimistic, and by May/June 2004, many felt like little had actually changed.
First Round of Interviews
During the first round of 27 interviews, many people saw a need for someone to oversee the
closures system. There was a generally positive attitude towards becoming system thinkers and
a sense that system integrators could make a difference in the quality of a vehicle. As one
functional closures engineer said, "I think [the system integrator] will be able to help". Another
voiced his opinion saying, "it may need to be tweaked a little bit, in terms of this integrator role.
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But I think the concept is very sound. It's definitely an opportunity." One of the SIs explained
how he felt his new role could improve the quality of closures:
[Part of my job as an SI is to] make sure that [the functional engineers are]
looking at [the design process] from the big picture perspective. Because I think a
lot of our guys, even though they are good, they don't see the big picture. A lot of
it has to do with inexperience, or just not doing that commodity before. So I think
an integrator can help explain that system, as well as its trade-offs and interfaces,
and what the implication of certain actions might be on their part. So in that
regard, I think that will make a huge difference in terms of what the customer
eventually sees in the side door system.
Of course, there still remained some skepticism and doubt about the SI role being another "flavor
of the month" initiative, but even so, people agreed that an SI would be very helpful if they were
able to tackle the systemic issues that existed. Early meetings with the engineering VP helped to
energize the SIs and improved their morale by knowing that upper management also recognized
the need for system engineering work. People recognized the cultural and organizational hurdles
that impeded systems work, but felt that the SI initiative had enough high-level support that the
problems would be surmountable. One SI mentioned,
I think originally, early on, I was a little worried that [the SI role] might not take
off. That it would be deemed a non-value-added position. But I think I've seen
enough backing [at the upper management] level, on down through the [middle
management], that this really is something that everyone's buying into. They see
the benefit of it now; there's been a lot of good dialogue probably in the last two
months. It seems like the organization recognizes a need for it. And right now
we've got a chance [to make a difference]. ... I think we're getting the support that
we need to make it happen.
One functional engineer expressed his hope that the SI "would bring the closures system closer
to a world class closures". Another functional engineer talked about his early vision for SIs as
being able to take attribute delivery to a "higher level playing field". He was very optimistic
about the possibilities of having SIs to manage the conflicting attributes:
[The] reason we're talking about a system integrator is we're talking about a
collection of components whose performance has attributes that are diametrically
opposed to each other. Because you can make the stiffest seal in the world and
pass all the wind stuff, but then you can't close the door. And that's why it's an
issue in the first place. I think ultimately, if we staff the position correctly, we
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support it long term, and we actually protect it from the ebbs and flows of our
Wall Street performance so that that's a stable position, we could actually develop
some technological breakthroughs that address this diametrically opposed physics
issue. Kind of get it to a little higher level playing field. Right now we tend to
bang our head against the wall a little bit because the physics are what they are,
but maybe there's a way that we can come up with a different technology
altogether. That's what I think the ultimate solution is, such that the two good
things don't always oppose each other.
Second Round of Interviews
By January 2004, the VPs were less involved. SIs were not as optimistic and felt like they were
being pulled off in other directions, which meant they didn't have the time or resources to
conduct the real system engineering work. One SI mentioned that the job was "becoming much
more of a stretch assignment than I originally thought."
There were small successes, but many more hindrances, and the loss of the VPs spotlight meant
that the initiative began to lose its way. There were also issues with being able to drive change
as "first among equals" in that "the difficulty right now is, we're 'first amongst equals,' but
we're not really 'first amongst equals"'. Another SI answered with one word, "poorly", when
asked how the first among equals was working in his group. SIs were relying more on their
fellow supervisors' sense of goodwill rather than having any formal authority. As one SI noted,
his biggest fear has become a reality:
... [In order to drive changes in the design], you are working with your peers.
You don't have any resources. And really you depend on your motivational
techniques or skills in order to have people follow-up on assignments and do
things in order to get the job done. I think, as far the integrator [role], it's
probably the biggest hurdle to overcome.
Third Round of Interviews
In March 2004, a survey was issued to the SIs which tried to clarify the kind of work they were
actually doing versus the kind of work they felt they should be doing. The results were as
follows:
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Question to SIs: "What percent of your time are you currently [and
should be] spending in each of the following areas?"
should be current current current
Average average high low
Firefighting 7 42 100 15
engineering work on programs 23 22 30 0
systems coordination 22 13 30 0
systems analysis 37 15 30 0
unproductive meetings 3 20 0
Paperwork 2 14 0
technical/analytical tool dev. 2 2 10 0
Developing standards 9 2 5 0
Figure 9: SI Survey Results
Notice that the SIs were spending a significant amount of their time firefighting, much more so
than they believed they should. Consequently, they were unable to spend as much time as they
thought they should on systems coordination, systems analysis, and the development of
standards.
When the final round of interviews was conducted, the SIs were clearly feeling like little had
really changed. The SIs were spending much of their time performing non-systems work, or
systems work but at a later stage in the program when it was much more costly and time
consuming to perform. They felt like they were unable to make much of a difference in the
program and were simply "filling in the gaps" in closures engineering.
There was also a lack of consensus amongst the middle managers as to the SI's objectives. The
middle managers needed and expected their SIs to focus on program related work. They
believed another organization, possibly advanced engineering, should develop the system tools,
not the SIs themselves. This discrepancy of what the SI's job entailed further compounded their
sense of being lost or forgotten.
Many SIs also felt like their "worst fears" had come true: they had all the responsibility to
deliver a door system but none of the authority to do so. Their scope had become so broad,
many felt unable to accomplish their original vision of a systems engineering based process for
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the product development of closures. One SI indicated his exasperation with the job's scope
creep, saying how his management felt that "if there's anything that touches, breathes, gets near,
[or] could be, part of a closures panel, it's somehow part of [my] responsibility to make sure
everything's right". Many more doubts emerged within the SIs, feeling like it might not have
been a wise career move to become an SI because the position was becoming a "dumping ground
for [closures] problems that no one else knows how to solve".
So why is it that the SIs have not been able to address the systemic issues they were assigned to
address? Why has the role become a dumping ground for projects no one else knows how to
solve? Most Closure Departments began to deploy SIs in August 2003, but have not been able to
achieve their goals of system optimization. What went wrong? What could have been done
differently? These questions will be addressed in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter answers the question of"why" SI selection and deployment at Alpha fell short of
reaching the original objectives. It also provides suggestions on what would have worked better.
Specific focus will be given to the SI selection process, which includes identification of the ideal
SI candidate.
What is required to introduce system thinking in an organization?
A literature review was performed to determine what is required to introduce system engineers
into a large engineering organization. Given the variety in organizational cultures and technical
maturity, the hurdles that must be overcome by system engineers is by no means uniform across
all industries. However, first it must be acknowledged that the introduction of system engineers
and systems thinking is not only a modification in the technical approach to product
development, but is also a cultural modification. Lentz [2000] argues that institutionalizing
systems engineering in commercial enterprises requires a culture change, and cultural changes
are "not for the faint hearted" since it takes at least 5 to 7 years to take hold. Thus, a strong
commitment by upper management is required in order to pioneer such an effort (Popick and
Sheard 1996, Carlson 1991, Percivall 1992, Fisher 1992, Lentz 2000). Modification or
massaging of an organization's culture takes time, persistence, and a strong impetus, which
usually takes the form of upper level management's drive for implementation.
The champion for implementing systems thinking must have a vision that can be communicated
to others and understood as being a better way of doing business. The benefits must be tangible
and understandable by those who will participate. As Klein [2004] describes, there must be a
pull for change, otherwise it is analogous with pushing on a rope - the idea will go nowhere.
Essentially, the champion can effectively answer the question of what are systems engineers and
why they should be brought on-board. The champion can build an internal understanding and
motivation for change within the employees.
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A subset to the question of why a company should introduce systems engineers is why should I
become an SE at my company? Successful implementation of systems engineers in the defense
and aerospace industries have shown that SEs have a clear career path and the company has
individuals in upper management who have SE experience (Fisher 1992, Carlson 1991). High
level executives with SE experience provide a clear signal that SE is valued. The SE position
must be seen as desirable and as an acknowledgement of a person's expertise; otherwise, it will
not be filled with some of the best people. Given that the introduction of systems thinking within
an organization is so difficult from both a technical and cultural standpoint, strong leaders at both
the executive and practicing level are required for it to become institutionalized.
Once there is sufficient organizational buy-in to the benefits of systems engineering, the question
of how it will deliver results must be answered. Thus, the process of systems engineering is
defined. To introduce Systems Engineers without a clearly defined purpose and aligned process
for delivering those goals is like jumping to a solution without identifying the specific problem
and its associated root cause(s).
Before we define the process, we must acknowledge that it has both technical and cultural
aspects. While the process may be about how one can technically deliver a product, it must also
work within the construct of the extant culture in order for the process to be embraced (Newbern
and Nolte 2000). As Lentz [2000] pointed out, cultural changes take a tremendous time
commitment, and it is more of an evolving change rather than a sudden switch. Again, the SEs
must be strong leaders in order to drive the process as well as its acceptance by the interfacing
activities. Given that a company's culture cannot be taught in a classroom, the SE has to be
someone within the organization who has several years' worth of experience in the product
development group (Fisher 1992, Lentz 2000). However, this "insider" (Lentz 2000, Klein
2004) by virtue of the company's non-systems focus, will not have sufficient training in the
methodologies of systems engineering. Therefore, it is necessary to have "insiders" who can
mitigate the cultural issues associated with the introduction of system engineers, but also
someone or something to provide insight to the system engineering methods/tools. This can be
accomplished by either training specific "insiders" in systems engineering or coupling them with
systems engineers from other systems-established companies who can provide on-the-job
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training. (Fisher 1992, Percivall 1992, Carlson 1991, Lentz 2000) The insider and outsider can
work together to "translate" the systems engineering processes from other industries into
processes that are tailored to the company's product and will work within the culture.
In summary, the literature shows that an organization wanting to embrace systems thinking
should have and acknowledge the following elements if the introduction is to be successful: the
technical challenge, the cultural impediments, the need for strong champions at the executive
level, the need for leaders who can convey the vision at all levels, a well-defined process for
system optimization that works within the cultural context, an SE position that is fits within the
organization, and properly experienced/trained SEs.
The Trailblazer
Alpha Company got ahead of themselves and defined the roles and responsibilities (albeit
generically as seen in Chapter 2) of their SIs without determining a process. Giving someone a
role without the context of a process is like asking someone to blaze trails through a jungle
without a map, compass or machete - how could you get there, and where exactly is "there"?
You will make some progress and move forward (e.g. the door key pad anecdote), with
accomplishments to note, but the path will most likely be circuitous and involve the unnecessary
expenditure of energy pursuing indirect routes. It is trial by error and hardy efficient. Therefore,
if an organization wants to make their SIs as effective as possible, outfit the trailblazer with a
map, a compass, and a machete, or rather, a clearly defined system, system tools to evaluate
system performance, and a well-defined process.
The trailblazer's map represents the technical interrelations of the system's components. In
addition, the map should contain a scale (system performance) and the topography
(organizational culture) of the area. Geographical topography is analogous with the
organization's culture because certain paths of system optimization will be more difficult than
others, just as it might be a shorter distance over a mountain but less work to go around it. There
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are many ways to optimize the system, just as there are many ways to get from point A to B, and
it is the SI's job to find the most efficient path.
The compass is the tool a trailblazer uses to determine where he is at any given time, using the
map as his reference point. So too, an SI needs system tools that can evaluate or predict the
system's performance with respect to its attributes. Without a compass, you can have a general
idea about where you might be on the map given topographical information, but you can't be
certain. Likewise, SIs who don't have system tools may be able to estimate their ability to meet
system goals, but they cannot be certain. They can probably find their way, but it is unlikely to
be the most direct or most effective.
Finally, the machete is a tool that allows the trailblazer to more easily walk from point A to point
B. You can argue that a helicopter would be a better instrument to transport him to his final
destination and that may be accurate, but it depends on the topography. Hence, what may work
in one environment will not necessarily work in another. Either way, the machete and the
helicopter help define the process by which the trailblazer can move toward his goals. One is
just a more appropriate process than the other.
In order to determine which process would be best, you must understand the situation. For
instance, if the trailblazer is in the jungle, then a car will be useless even though it is often an
effective mechanism to transport people to other locations. The most effective process can be
determined only once you have the map and a compass to tell you where you currently are. For
instance, if you only have a mile to go and a day to travel, a machete may be the best choice.
However, if you must travel 100 miles in a day through unchartered jungles and across a lake,
then a machete won't work. My point is that the right process depends on the extent of the need
(e.g. distance/timeline) and the technical & cultural framework (topography). With a process,
you can then define the roles and responsibilities of an SI (trailblazer) and the supporting
organizations, both internal and external to the closures group, such that the process can be
realized.
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#1: Business need - the "pull" for change
If there is no reason to change the way you do business, then the status quo reigns. Even if there
is a reason to change but no one perceives it to be necessary to their survival or even success,
then the status quo shall remain unchanged. After all, the status quo has worked so far, assuming
the company is still in business. So in order for any kind of real, long-lasting change, or "true
change" to occur, there must be a perceived need. This need acts as a pull within the
organization, and can take a variety of forms, but must be visible at both the macro and micro
levels (Klein 2004). Using the trailblazer analogy, the trailblazer must have a good reason for
getting to point B and will be most effective if that need is understood.
For instance, at Alpha, the macro level need or pull is that the #1 source of customer
dissatisfaction with their vehicles is windnoise, of which doors are a significant contributor.
There is a clear business need, namely customer satisfaction, which ultimately translates into
profit. This need is easily communicated, given industry-recognized quality metrics like JD
Powers which compares all vehicle makes and models. Other companies were not plagued with
windnoise issues across the board, so clearly, Alpha's windnoise problems were notable.
The micro pull acts at the working-level, whereby the component engineers have a reason or
need to change their work process. While the primary source of customer satisfaction is
something employees want to remedy, it is not easy to translate into what a component engineer
can do to help. There must be a more tangible, micro pull. In Alpha's case, this micro pull was
the recognition that closure systems attributes were consistently a problem at launch and much of
their time was spent in the last few months of the design process trying to remedy these emergent
issues. It was recognized that there might be a way to prevent these issues from emerging so late
in the program's development and the assignment of an individual responsible for the entire
system could solve these issues once and for all.
For those less optimistic, they are pushed by upper management's demand for system integrators
who would deliver the system-level attributes for doors. While this push for change is not
enough for sustained, institutionalized change, it may act as an initial motivating force for non-
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believers. However, if there is no perceivable business need at the micro level, the change
initiative will be given lip service and fade as soon as upper management stops focusing on it.
Alpha met several needs of the first element of successfully introducing SIs: there was a
tangible, concrete need at a macro level for delivering improved windnoise performance, and the
current product development process was unable to provide such results. Something had to
change, and many people at different levels within the organization recognized it due to the
chronic nature of these systemic issues. However, it is also true that others did not understand
(at the micro level) how a systems approach could actually help. Many felt that issues pertaining
to windnoise and closing efforts were just a fact of building cars. They received information
from the cascade meeting that said these attributes were problematic and SIs were going to fix it,
but they did not see changes in their particular metrics so did not understand what part they
might play in delivering robust attributes. The vision was not fully understood by everyone and
therefore, the implementation of SIs was part pull, part push at the micro level.
#2: Recognition of need for cultural change
It is easy to understand how, after recognizing a business need for change, one might jump to a
purely technical solution. For instance, maybe Alpha should designate an SI to control the
closure systems attributes, taking a deep dive into how they can deliver an optimized system.
However, to ignore the extant culture in which the organization operates is to doom the effort to
failure, because the status quo and culture are intertwined. There is a culture that supports the
optimization of components rather than the system. It is not enough to simply designate a person
to be responsible for the system when there remain other forces at work to maintain the status
quo: optimization of components. For example, why is it that Alpha optimizes components?
Before you can truly change the resulting behavior, you must understand the motivation behind
it. Similarly, the trailblazer should know the terrain around points A and B before he plots the
best course between them.
In an effort to understand the cultural assumptions and mindsets that drive component
optimization at Alpha, the 85 interviews were reviewed for insights. A system dynamics
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feedback model was completed, indicating "how things are done" at Alpha (i.e. the motivating
forces acting within the organization). It was later reviewed with the integrators and their
managers for feedback on its accuracy.
There are 3 distinct chunks that make up the complete system feedback loop: resource
constraints, a component focused mentality, and management processes. Each chunk is shown
below with brief discussions on how they are self-fulfilling and ultimately contribute to
subsystem optimization. Finally, the three chunks will be assembled to show how they interact
with each other.
Figure 10: Resource Constraints - Chunk #1
The first chunk, resource constraints, is quite common in many organizations and can be difficult
to overcome. If we start with the far right hand side, we see that firefighting leads to stress, then
burnout, churning/attrition, headcount shortages, and then severely overloaded employees, which
feeds back into the original issue of coming in and out of problems/firefighting. Also, because
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employees are severely overloaded, they have no time to train new engineers such that there is a
lack of trained engineers. Early retirements and difficulties in finding the right standards for
design contribute to the lack of trained engineers. For anyone who is not well versed in a
process, mistakes are made and they are less efficient than experienced employees, so your lack
of trained engineers ultimately leads to less time to do engineering work, which contributes to
shortcuts being made and more firefighting efforts. As one employee said:
We're really good at putting fires out and reacting to issues. We're a
reactionary culture, so we find a problem and we jump in, and fix it in 24
hours, build the next 1000 vehicles and everybody goes home happy. The
deepest problems can't be solved that fast, and everybody knows it. We never
go back and find out the real root cause and put the real prevention in place.
We just don't have the time for it. We have too many other fires to work on.
The key leverage points in this chunk of the model are the firefighting status quo and the lack of
trained engineers. Somehow, the organization needs to transition out of the firefighting mode so
they can begin, among other things, to attack the "deepest problems" like system interface issues.
This could be accomplished in many ways. Firefighting might be minimized by curtailing the
number of programs in the development cycle, by hiring experienced engineers from other
automotive companies to address the lack of trained engineers, or by instilling an active
mentoring program where new engineers are paired with an experienced person so that they can
learn first hand. However, keep in mind that this is but one portion of the cultural analysis that
feeds into component or subsystem optimization. The entire culture must be understood before
one attempts to create solutions, because what might look like an excellent solution in one small
portion of the feedback analysis might be counter productive when considering the bigger
picture.
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Figure 11: Component-Focused Mentality - Chunk #2
The second chunk of the overall system feedback loop is the component-focused mentality at
Alpha. This is where the direct influences on subsystem optimization are apparent. Notice how
the firefighting mode discussed in the resource constraint chunk (shown here in the bottom right
of Figure 11) feeds into searching for a quick or unique solution for a particular program, as well
as no time to address system issues or tool development. Given that there's no time to address
system issues, there is a lack of agreement on a standard architecture and therefore no
I
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implemented standard architecture, all of which leads to constantly "re-inventing the wheel" for
each program, and then more firefighting.
In Alpha's case, their introduction of SIs combats "no time to address system issues/tool
development" which is shown in a yellow bubble in Figure 11. Clearly, the effort can aid in
avoiding subsystem optimization, but there are many other forces, or cultural norms, that will
work against the SI. One example is that groups are often looking for quick and unique solutions
due to their firefighting mentality, and this will still be in place to encourage subsystem
optimization even with the introduction of SIs. A second example is the chimney mentality
which feeds the lack of system level metrics for system level tradeoffs, little incentive to resolve
lack of alignment across the organization, an attitude of defensiveness amongst the groups, a lack
of management knowledge about how to resolve system issues, and even a purchasing
department which ultimately encourages suppliers to have their own unique designs in the
pursuit of the lowest component cost.
Possible remedies for the component-focused chunk are truly a combination of efforts. There is
no one "silver bullet" that will resolve it. Alpha made a positive move by introducing SIs that
could address the lack of time to manage system issues. However, they might also consider who
can be responsible for developing the system tools that are required, and who should be
responsible for determining a standard architecture.
If Alpha chooses to address the problems that come with strong functional chimneys, they may
be able to reduce the cultural resistance to system optimization. As it stands, an integrator's
efforts will continually be thwarted by strong chimneys if optimization of the system requires a
compromise on their particular subsystem. If the overarching organization that encompasses the
effected chimneys can demand and reward chimney interaction as well as the support of system
level metrics then the silo's resistance to subsystem concessions may be overcome. Alpha might
accomplish this by encouraging cross-functional assignments where employees are exposed to
the needs/demands of other organizations. This would help break down some of the walls that
have been built to separate the fiefdoms. It will likely require a change in objectives for
everyone involved as well as a consistent valuation of system performance over component
__
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performance. It requires a commitment to value teamwork over individual accomplishments.
This type of shift in a company's culture is undoubtedly immense but at the very least needs to
be understood and partially addressed if systems thinking is to become institutionalized.
Management Processes
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Figure 12: Management Processes - Chunk #3
The third and final chunk can be understood as the management process or style at Alpha, shown
in Figure 12. At the bottom right, there are two factors that were shown in the resource
constrained chunk: Lack of trained engineers, and less time to do engineering work. Here, the
lack of trained engineers encourages micro-managing to check people's work. This can be a
healthy response to ensure the product is not adversely affected given that inexperienced
engineers are working on the project. However, micro-management can be deleterious if used in
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excess. It can lead to more administrative/tracking tasks and more audits/report outs to
management, which give employees less time to do engineering work. This holds true for
managers as well, as they become buried in the engineering details and do not have sufficient
time to perform their managerial role in the process.
Micro-management can also lead to an employee's sense of being unempowered because they
feel they cannot make any decisions on their own, which leads to further frustration and stress.
Additionally, when employees are micro-managed, they may not learn the decision-making skills
that they should, so that they too are insufficiently trained. Therefore, the more micro-
management, the less prepared employees are to be self-sufficient in making decisions that
should be made at their level.
Finally, Alpha's demand and expectation for flawless execution encourages micro-management
and culminates a fear of failure. This fear is further fueled by a culture that wants to avoid the
punishment/blame/pain of being identified as the source of a problem in the report-outs to
management. Again, their motivation is a result of this expectation of flawless execution and the
need to micro-manage the untrained engineers.
Figure 13 pulls all three chunks together to form the complete system dynamics feedback
analysis. It was reviewed with SIs, middle and upper management for accuracy, most of whom
thought it was an excellent representation of how things work in all of Alpha, not just the
closures group.

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Figure 13: Cultural analysis of Alpha's engineering group
On the right side of Figure 13, you can see that optimizing the subsystem (shown in the blue
bubble) is the result of many factors. If this was a 3 dimensional diagram, "optimize subsystem"
would be below most everything else, indicating that it is an end state, or low energy place where
things rest.
Direct influences of subsystem optimization are the lack of system tools, the lack of system-level
metrics for system-level tradeoffs, little incentive to resolve lack of alignment, defensiveness, the
presence of tools that evaluate component performance, and engineers looking for quick, unique
solutions to their issues. Indirectly, though, there are several mechanisms whereby the cultural
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assumptions and ways of doing business support subsystem optimization and will therefore resist
system optimization.
Clearly, there are many forces/assumptions/cultural norms that encourage and support the status
quo whereby the subsystems are optimized in lieu of the entire system. Just introducing an SI
who has the goal of optimizing the whole will not likely work. There is too much momentum
and motivation behind the current culture for a single point of attack to be successful. Alpha
should make a concerted effort with several points of attack in order to change the "end state" of
the culture from subsystem to system optimization. Specifically, Alpha may wish to look at
ways to address the direct feeds into subsystem optimization, and consider ways to alleviate the
significant impact of resource constraints and management processes.
#3: SI Role Clarity - Defining the Process of System Optimization
In order for anyone to perform their job well, they must have a clear definition of what exactly
their job entails. If their role is amorphous, then just about any kind of work is plausibly their
work, and they can become inundated with tasks. A well-documented process with assigned
roles gives authority to every person/group involved because it is then clear exactly who is doing
what and why they are doing it. The process is the foundation that will enable an organization to
change from component to systems thinking.
The trailblazer cannot do his or her best by just having a topographical map with points A and B
properly marked. How can the trailblazer get from one point to the other? Should they walk and
clear the path with a machete, drive a car, or fly a helicopter? What impediments might be in
their way and what are the contingency plans for dealing with emergent issues? These are the
questions that are answered when a process is defined: The trailblazer shall use a machete to
chop through the rain forest in order to walk from point A to B.
In Alpha's case, a process would help protect the SI from taking on tangential work that is given
to them. At this time, only their R&Rs are defined, but not in the context of a process. Given
that they have such a generic task of delivering an optimized door system, most any work
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associated with doors can become theirs. Unfortunately, the SI role has become a dumping
ground for projects related to doors that no one else knows how to solve. Since the SI doesn't
have a clear process, they have no way of determining whether or not that is within their scope of
responsibilities. One engineer expressed his fears about the SI role in the first round of
interviews, and foretold the exact problem that has transpired in the first year of implementation:
One of my concerns with this system integrator is we're going to constantly tend
to overload that person. Because it's very easy to do. We can say, okay, you go
do all this development of physics to understand the contribution analysis of each
bit in a system, and then you go wage the war with [engineering's] various
interfaces, internal and external of [engineering], to accomplish those elements of
the design. That's what we think that person is going to do. It's very easy to say,
okay, they should interface on locating strategies and assembly strategies with the
[manufacturing] integrator as well, and, oh, by the way, they should be in charge
of the SRI charts and all that other jazz because that's all interface work as well.
And we're going to bury this person into accomplishing nothing.
Just like all of the six sigma projects we do in this corporation, the biggest critical
success factor is scope definition. Many, many of the six sigma projects take
longer than expected and deliver less than expected because we didn't refine the
scope tight enough. And I perceive the system integrator to be the same exact
scenario, where we have not stripped down that person's role tight enough such
that they'll have a manageable level of workflow to be effective and not just do it
on the hot program of the day but really develop so our corporation benefits a
little sooner than otherwise.
A process would clearly define the scope of an SI such that they could be more effective and
actually accomplish the goals that have been set out for them. By the very nature of their
component-focus in engineering, any existing processes at Alpha are component-centric.
Mechanics ofAttribute Delivery
Alpha's focus on door systems was in 3 main categories: windnoise, water leaks, and closing
efforts. Once the organization determines how these attributes are delivered, then they can
consider what, exactly, to include in the generic system of doors. For example, do you need to
include the windows in the door system, or do they not contribute to the attributes? It is an
iterative approach, since we begin with the system loosely defined as side doors, but before we
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specifically identify the system's components, we should consider which ones contribute to
attribute performance.
While Alpha definitely cited the closure system's main functions (minimized windnoise, low
closing efforts, and no waterleaks) they did not delineate how exactly these functions are
delivered, or what the process would be to ensure their optimization. Ironically, Alpha moved
forward in defining the Roles and Responsibilities of an SI without understanding the process
though which they would operate. They effectively put the trailblazer in a jungle, told him his
goal was to reach point B, but gave him no map, compass or machete.
Alpha did have a few proposals about what was included in the closure system, but there was no
unilateral agreement amongst the Product Groups or analytic analysis. In fact, each Product
Group had slight variations on which components were included in the Closures Department.
Therefore, the resultant process, roles and responsibilities of an SI varied throughout Alpha.
It is helpful to use a Datum Flow Chaint (DFC) analysis in order to understand how a system's
attributes are delivered via the components and their interactions. A DFC is a visual
representation of the interaction of components, and clearly indicates the interfaces that deliver
any particular attribute. For instance, windnoise performance of a door is primarily delivered by
the interface of the dynamic seal(s) with the door and body side door opening panel (DOP). This
is commonly referred to as the seal gap. Windnoise is also affected by the flushness of the door
panel with the body, especially at the A pillar and the gap between the two (referred to as the
margin).
Attributes are represented in a DFC model with two parallel lines between the relevant interfaces
of components. (See Figure 14) The seal gap, which is the primary determinant of windnoise, is
shown below as the left-most parallel line between the body seal to front door inner panel (J
surface). Directly to the right of it are the margin and flushness attributes between the body side
DOP edge and the door's outer surface edge.
t For a more detailed explanation of the DFC, its origins, and other applications, refer to Dan Whitney's book,
Mechanical Assemblies..., 2004.
___ _
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Figure 14: DFC of a closure system, by Chris McFadden (Midstream presentation, 9/27/04)
Notice that oftentimes, attributes are delivered by an indirect interface of components. For
instance, the flushness of the door to the body is determined by the hinges, not the actual
components themselves. Thus, it is not enough to include the body and front door as your
system since the opportunity for adjustment lies in the hinges.
The DFC model serves a few major functions that will prove useful to SIs:
1. It clearly defines the exact portions of components that deliver attributes, thereby
providing a concise model to understand how an attribute is physically achieved.
2. Shows the technical interdependencies of components within a given system
3. Provides insight into how the delivery of an attribute or function may be influenced
by certain component design changes
4. Helps system engineers anticipate how a change in one component's design might
affect the system's performance
5. Identifies areas where analytical tools may be required to aid in the optimization of a
given attribute
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DFC models should be created for all attributes and their delivery method(s), but is not included
here since it exceeds the scope of my thesis.
Revisiting the System's Definition
With a clear understanding of the closure system's attributes and how they are delivered, you can
now return to the question of what exactly the system entails. Is the initial version sufficient or
has it left out critical components? Certain tools like boundary diagrams and functional trees
may be used to delineate what is and is not included in the closures system. Depending on the
organization, one may be more useful than the other.
At Alpha, a boundary diagram would have been very helpful in determining which components
fell within the system and could thereby be treated as variables under a system engineer's
control. Items outside the system boundary can then be understood as external interfaces that
must be managed by the SI. A boundary diagram is also useful in explaining the scope of
"what's included" to other people who will also benefit from clarity of roles. If no boundaries
are clearly formed, then the system is invariably amorphous and thereby introduces unnecessary
confusion for all stakeholders. A proposed boundary diagram for the closures system has been
given below in Figure 14.
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Side Door Closures Boundary Diagram
Closures System
,/AInterfacing
components
Body side panel
Front Fender
Instrument Panel
Seats
Steering Wheel
Interfacing
> organizations
Electrical software
Design Studio
Suppliers
Program Mngmt
Vehicle Engr
Manuf. Plant
Ergonomics
Veh. Packaging
Safety Group
Vehicle Testing
Figure 15: Proposed Closures Boundary Diagram
Currently, Alpha does not have all of these components within the closures system group. One
example is the door lock which is certainly a major contributor to closing efforts. There are
cultural and organizational reasons as to why door locks are not included, but if a boundary
diagram had been done, components such as these might have been included under the purview
of SIs.
It may prove helpful to understand the current flow of information when determining a process.
A design structure matrix (DSM§) is a visual representation of how information flows between
groups and represents a part of the existing process. The organizational interfaces become
apparent in a DSM and the interfacing groups that ultimately deliver the system in question are
§ For further information on DSMs, refer to Ulrich and Eppinger, Product Design and Development, 2000.
Inner/outer door sheet metal
Outside mirror & attachments
Inner door panel trim
Inner/outer door handles
Door hinges
Door locks and mechanisms
Window regulators
Side glass
Glass run weather strips
All side door dynamic seals
Stereo speakers
Air circulation vents (if inside the door)
Electrical hardware (e.g. grommets, switches)
Any other components within the door
- v
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clearly indicated. It also follows the natural progression of product development with roles
identified based on the design stage.
The Process of delivering system attributes
The difficulty of determining a system-level optimization process should not be underestimated.
By the very nature of their component-focus in engineering, any existing processes at Alpha are
component-centric. Therefore, it will be a time consuming and thought intensive activity
because it deviates from what is understood or practiced.
The process needs to account for all the items mentioned previously:
· The extent of the business need
· The cultural landscape
· The system attributes and their delivery mechanism
· The system boundaries
While the process is meant to transform the culture and the product development methodology, it
must initially work with the extant culture and processes in order for it to be accepted. If the
process is incredibly revolutionary, it will be highly disruptive to the organization and will be
even more difficult to institutionalize.
The process should be defined by both "insiders" and "outsiders". Alpha can either pull in
people from both perspectives or train their insiders to have an outsider perspective. Insiders at
Alpha would consist of well-experienced closures engineers who have several years' worth of
experience from product conception to production and final phase-out. They need to understand
the business need, cultural landscape, the system attributes and their delivery mechanism, and
current organizational boundaries. The outsider needs to have a bigger perspective on how the
system can be optimized, with a vision that is holistic and not component-centric. They provide
the vision that is unencumbered with cultural norms, or the acceptance of "that's just how we've
always done things". It is possible to create outsiders on the inside, and for Alpha, that could
happen with outside training in systems thinking. Either way, the most effective process would
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be determined by a group of people who provide the insider and outsider perspectives. Together,
they can outline the current process and create a new process, using boundary diagrams, DFCs
and DSMs as needed.
It will take a significant amount of time for the process to be determined, but introducing an
integrator without a process is guaranteed to be ineffective. The work must be done up-front,
before any SIs begin their program work. Only after the process is defined can an SI's roles and
responsibilities that support the process be determined. Note that with a process, the other
groups can understand their role and more readily accept the introduction of SIs.
Given that the SIs at Alpha were not properly outfitted with a process, they felt as if they had all
the responsibility of delivering system-level functions but no authority to drive change. They are
trying to keep their heads above water as they are inundated with closures-related work. A well-
defined process for the organization is absolutely critical to the SIs' future success.
#4: Understanding the necessary skills of an SI
The next question is about what skills, knowledge, or aptitudes does the system integrator need
to have? In other words, what criteria do you use to select the best trailblazer? An effective SI
must have both technical and soft skills since system engineering is part science, part art. The SI
must be able to flourish in both realms.
This step is analogous to determining what kind of trailblazer you need. They certainly need to
know how to read a topographical map, use a compass, and navigate through the terrain. But
what specific skills are required? Do they need upper body strength to wield a machete, or a
pilot's license so they can fly a helicopter?
To date, there are no known studies on what skills are required of SIs in industry. However,
since SIs are a particular subset of system engineers, it is useful and appropriate to understand
how others have determined the required skills set of SEs.
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What are the necessary skills of Systems Engineers?
While only a small number of studies have been done, the crucial skills vary based on the type of
systems work the person will perform. (Sheard 1996) Some SEs work on the system level
architecture while others focus on the downstream system level integration testing. However,
generalities can and have been drawn.
Percivall [1992] states that any candidate for systems engineering positions should have the
following key attributes:
... intelligence (analytical and practical), a big picture outlook, excellent
interpersonal skills (verbal as well as written), and, a tenacious yet composed
demeanor. The candidates should have deep technical knowledge in at least one
design area. The candidate should be given experience which widens their
viewpoint to all areas.... The candidate should develop and in-depth
understanding of the design process and an acute awareness of the organization
and its dynamics.
Others, like Fisher [1992], state that "The most desirable systems engineer has a strong technical
background and a number of years experience in a subsystem design area. ... This ensures a
technical background that will be valuable, as well as familiarity with the design process".
Fisher indicates that Hughes Aircraft Company has had "good results" recruiting students from
good universities to their in-house systems engineering program, which consists of formal
courses in Hughes technology and system engineering processes. However, he states that "most
skills are acquired through on-the-job training with senior systems engineers in the program
environment". Clearly, one must be an "insider", either by numerous years with a company or
by accelerated on-the-job training, to be an effective systems engineer.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. has introduced a 2 year training program for systems engineers
since their need exceeded the existence of "home grown" SEs. (Carlson 1991) By examining the
criteria for candidates applying to the Systems Engineering Training (SET) program, we can
infer what they believe are the aptitudes required of SEs:
* Demonstrated superior work performance
· Four to six years applicable job experience
· Appropriate academic training and degree(s)
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* Strong interest in Systems Engineering type of work
· Highly motivated
· Good interpersonal skills
· Strong commitment to the Company
Note that training at Lockheed involves extensive course work, mentorship, and on-the-job
training, thereby effectively addressing both the technical and cultural aspects of being an
effective SE.
A separate study was conducted by Watts and Mar [1997], referencing 25 responses to a survey
aimed to "identify what skills and knowledge companies consider important for systems
engineers to have". The results indicated that the "critical" skills and knowledge were:
· basic problem solving
· development and management of requirements
· teamwork and communication
· system optimization (trade studies and decision making)
The most comprehensive study found was conducted by Frank [2000], where he researched the
question, "what are the qualifications (knowledge, skills and aptitudes) required from systems
engineers?" Drawing upon 28 interviews, 14 lectures and 2 observation sites, Frank identified
31 skills and 11 personal aptitudes required of a systems engineer. These skills and aptitudes are
listed in Appendix B. Frank concludes from his research that:
The systems engineer has to have a thorough knowledge in at least one major
engineering field... has to be familiar with systems and technologies relevant to
this function and have basic knowledge in other related engineering topics. ...
A system engineer must be capable of anticipating, understanding and detailing
all the implications (including the side effects) of the modifications, engineering
as well as non engineering, both those initiated by the contractor and those
required by the customer after the system has been handed over or after "closing"
the design. On many occasions, that system engineer must be capable of handling
all the modification stages, commencing from the submission of the idea through
the approvals to the controlling and the documenting of the modification.
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While Frank's research on the generic SE skills & personal aptitudes is an excellent compilation,
it is not very useful for a company's specific application. Frank's research does not give any
relative importance of these skill and aptitudes, making it difficult for any organization to
determine the probable efficacy of one system engineering candidate over another. A more
specific and analytical approach to determining the required skills set of SIs would be useful.
Determining the SI's skills for Alpha
The integrator' s role was not well defined in its early phase of implementation at Alpha, and the
managers' actual selection process varied from Product Group to Product Group. Some
managers appointed some of their best people to the job and closely evaluated how well a
person' s technical and "soft" skills matched those they felt were necessary for the position.
Others seemed to appoint people who were currently available and had some experience in
closures.
Even for those managers who carefully evaluated candidates, their selection criteria were
generally good but were based on personal opinion on what would be required. They took
educated guesses, but they were guesses none the less. A more substantive, quantifiable and
rigorous approach is required, especially when you consider the magnitude of effort required to
introduce a new way of thinking into an existing organization and culture.
This thesis suggests that an analytical approach to determining the necessary skills set for SIs is
not only possible but highly beneficial in the overall scope of effectively deploying SIs. A
critical step in determining the required skills is a well defined process.
Using the DFC models that were inputs to key element #3, you can define the technical skills for
an ideal system integrator. The SI should have a depth of experience in at least 1 of the major
components found in the DFC that play a significant role in the delivery of a critical attribute.
The SI also needs to have a breadth of experience in the other components involved in the DFC
because the interaction of components is what delivers an attribute. The SI needs to appreciate
the engineering workload, constraints and possibilities associated with designing each interfacing
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component. If analysis tools are available for predicting system attribute performance, a
working knowledge of such tools would also be necessary.
The DFC model shown in Figure 13 indicates that an SI should have a depth of experience in at
least one of the following component design activities and a thorough understanding of the
design process for all others:
) Side door sheet metal
> Dynamic seals
> Upper and lower door hinges
> Body Side DOP
Obviously, all DFCs should be mapped before the above list can be completed.
The SI will also need to be respected by the interfacing groups, but achievement of respect is
highly dependent on the organization. Again, the culture must be considered. For some, it may
simply be about hierarchical position. Other organizations might require a plethora of
experience and a well-established network. A more technocratic culture might respect someone
with sufficiently convincing data regardless of their years in the industry. The interviews
indicated that a lot of experience is required for SIs if they are to be respected at Alpha.
The soft skills for SIs at Alpha can be determined by understanding the culture and what will be
necessary to make the process work. What does the SI need to do in order to pull change
through the organization and address the cultural resistance? Drawing upon the 85 interviews
and the resultant cultural analysis, the following soft skills emerge as critical:
> Sees the bigger picture - can lead transition from component to systems thinking.
> Share an outsider's perspective in how the business could be systems focused.
> Excellent communication skills - can share the vision of a systems approach with the
functional groups.
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Strong leader who can work in teams - needs to be comfortable with cross-functional
efforts. Able to depend on others for work, i.e. doesn't need to micromanage.
Needs to be comfortable with not having all the answers.
> Encourage honest discourse - must work to eliminate other people's fears of failure
and concern for blame. Must be able to pioneer the shift to "lets work as a team to
fix the problem" from the current mentality of figuring out who is to blame for the
problem at hand.
> Able to motivate others and drive change.
If individuals with these soft and technical skills may not exist in Alpha's work force, most
aspects can be taught. Certain training can be done in the classroom, like the engineering
discipline, systems engineering, concepts of system architecture and system optimization. Other
skills must be learned on the job, like understanding the culture, the current process, and the
issues related to taking a product from conception to release.
Selection of SIs should be done with the ideal SI's characteristics as the benchmark. An
appropriate training plan, either in the class room or on the job, can then be determined based on
the needs of the candidate. Yet, the ideal SI has not been fully defined for Alpha's application
since the process has not been developed. Once you have defined a process, and assigned roles
and responsibilities that support the process, you can then determine the appropriate SIs.
#5: Supporting Structure
In order for SIs to be most effective, there must be a supporting structure and organization to
allow the transformation to a systems approach. If, for example, the trailblazer will have to
travel for several days, he might need food, water, sufficient clothing, and proper shelter if he is
to be the most efficient.
While there are many items that could fall within this key element, I will focus exclusively on
the supporting structure that exists or is still needed within Alpha.

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Organizational Alignment & Performance Measurement
First, Alpha successfully leveraged their culture by placing the SIs within the closures division,
where all the component design authority resides. If they had been allocated to an outside
organization, like Vehicle Engineering, they would not have been very effective. But within the
closures division, they have an opportunity to drive change. As one engineer said:
[The] real beauty of this whole idea of a system integrator [is that] for the very
first time, at least to my knowledge, [Alpha's] taken an attribute and put it in [the
functional engineering group]. If we don't put it in closures, I wouldn't do it,
because you're kind of doing the same old, same old.
The vision was that SIs should be the "first among equals", on par with the functional
supervisors, and able to drive final decisions for optimizing the system. While it is plausible that
the SI should be the "first among equals" as was originally envisioned, it has not happened. The
culture is so hierarchical that the lateral power held by SIs is ineffective, and ultimately relies on
people's sense of"goodwill". The SI must have authority to drive changes at the component
level and this would be possible if the SI was the assistant closures manager. The SI could be
one level higher on the hierarchical chain of command but still below the closures manager.
Alternatively, they could keep their position, but then the SI must be seen by their fellow
functional supervisors as the gateway to the manager's approval. Either way, the SI must be
perceived by the functional engineers as having the authority to influence their performance
reviews.
To compound the problem, component engineers are evaluated by their functional supervisors on
the performance of their component. While it is generally agreed that the overall system's
performance is more important the component's performance, the engineers' objectives are
based solely on their component's performance. This also holds true for the functional
supervisors who are evaluated on their subsystem's performance by their manager.
Remembering that system optimization typically means that some individual components will be
sub-optimized, it is nearly impossible for an SI to do their job when the functional group's
objectives remain solely focused on their component performance. Once Alpha is able to align
the objectives of their functional groups to focus on their contribution to the overall success of
the system, an SI can begin to work with the functional groups rather than compete with them.
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The result of SIs not having the proper authority to drive change at the component level was that
they were left with "all the responsibility without any authority". Notice that part of having the
appropriate authority is having aligned objectives within and outside of the closures division.
Performance reviews for all parties involved must include support of system optimization. With
a clearly defined process with associated roles and responsibilities, it becomes much easier to
align objectives in a clear and consistent manner.
System tools for trade-off analysis
Currently, there are a lack of systems tools, such that optimization of the closure system is
difficult. This is mostly a reflection of the component-focused culture, and is supported by the
fact that component-design and optimization tools abound. While it is understandable that
system tools do not exist within a component based company, their development is necessary for
this transformation to occur. SIs also need system tools in order to perform their job of
optimizing the system for all new products. These tools can provide a way for them to analyze
and predict the performance of a given design and direct component changes as necessary.
Additionally, these tools can help educate everyone about how components interact to deliver
system attributes, addressing the cultural issue identified in Figure 11 where there is a lack of
management knowledge/information on systems issues.
The DFC can be used to identify areas where attribute delivery is not well understood. For
instance, if you know that windnoise is a common problem yet have no way to predict the
performance of a given design, then an analytical tool may prove useful, with various inputs like
seal gap, flushness, margins, door rigidity, etc. The DFC can identify the component interfaces
that deliver the attribute and can begin efforts to understand and model the system. SIs equipped
with predictive system level models can lead the optimization effort with data which makes it
that much easier for functional engineers to understand their role in attribute delivery. It helps
clarify the way in which functional engineers support the system optimization in their objectives.
The tools also reinforce the process, or possibly suggest modifications to it that will improve its
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robustness. Either way, SIs need to have system tools to support their efforts, just as the
trailblazer needs a compass to navigate his way along the most efficient path.
An SI's Career Path
To draw in some of the most talented people, the SI position needs to be desirable. For the SI
role to take root, it cannot be seen as a dead-end job or a bad career move. For many of Alpha's
SIs who once saw this position as an excellent career move, they now believe it may be hurting
their prospects for future promotions. If the job of an SI becomes undesirable, then there is no
hope of embracing a systems approach because everyone will assume it is a dying effort not
worthy of their time or energy. Therefore, as part of the support structure for enabling SIs, they
must be a perceived value in their job.
The career path can either be a stepping stone to higher-level management positions, or it can be
more of a final destination. Lockheed Martin's program for SEs takes more of a stepping stone
approach, where it is a highly respected training program where people are typically given top
notch positions afterwards. Alternatively, the SI position could be much like the technical
specialist or subject-matter expert positions that exist in many companies. In this case, the SI
position would be more of a destination for employees with both a breadth and depth of
experience, and an ability to integrate. Neither path is unilaterally better than the other, but one
may work better than the other in certain organizations. As currently configured, Alpha's SI
position is probably better suited as a stepping stone to the closures manager position, and then
higher management positions where breadth increases. The SIs can help to drive change at all
levels of the organization as they climb the corporate ladder. For those SIs who want to stay in
the position, they can offer continuity to the SI role.
Mechanism for Information Sharing & Retention
Alpha was very perceptive in understanding the need for information sharing and retention
amongst the SIs. They created the SI Tech Club as the mechanism to share their experiences
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such that others can learn from them. Reviewing their Statement of Scope, they clearly defined
the purpose of the SI Tech Club:
· To develop a systems engineering basedprocess for the development of closures founded on
engineering-manufacturing cooperation.
· To share across Product Groups the Best-In-Class practices in closures and to develop and
implement improvements to the current practices/processes.
Currently, the SIs struggle to find effective ways of retaining their learnings, but this is truly
because they don't have a process to give the learnings any context. The creation of checklists
for engineering sign-off events is useful, but without a process, it becomes just one more
document held on a website or in someone's computer. You would have to know it's there in
order to use it. With a process, these checklists could be linked to it at the appropriate stage, and
everyone would be able to understand its usefulness. It would not be a stand-alone document,
easily forgotten. It would be one more useful piece in the puzzle of how to effectively deliver an
optimized system.
Furthermore, if SIs wish to reduce firefighting efforts in the future, a mechanism for sharing
information and lessons learned would be useful in avoiding similar problems down the road.
The knowledge must be available for new SIs so they can learn from their predecessors. Tacit
knowledge that simply resides in an individual person does not help the organization as a whole
to learn from prior experiences. If the process of engineering at the systems level is going to
improve, there must be some mechanism for the management of knowledge and transfer of
lessons learned to current and future engineers.
Summary of Alpha
The Alpha Company has made some significant efforts to encourage systems thinking by
introducing system integrators in the closures division. The two strong champions in upper
management who initiated the change have been critical to the introduction of SIs, and they have
provided a vision for how engineering can migrate from a component to systems focus. They
shared this vision of system integrators with their employees at all levels by personally hosting a
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"town hall" meeting. The SIs who were chosen generally shared the vision, and had both the
"insider" and "outsider" perspectives.
Unfortunately, Alpha made their biggest error in appointing SIs before they understood the
cultural issues and the process by which an SI could achieve their stated goal. Moreover, the
goals listed were so broad that anything that was associated with a door ultimately fell within the
SI's responsibilities. It is regrettable that the presumed "solution" of introducing system
integrators was initiated before the problem statement, goal(s), and process(es) were understood
and defined.
If Alpha can take the time and resources to address the following five key elements to
introducing and sustaining SIs in a component-focused organization, then it is possible to make
the upper management's vision a reality.
1. Business Need: There must exist a business need, or "pull" for change, that is visible
at the macro and micro level. The organization must see a need and want to migrate
to a systems approach.
2. Cultural Modification: There must be a recognized need for cultural change to
transition from component to systems thinking.
3. SI Role Clarity - Defining the Process of System Optimization: There must be a
clearly defined process for SIs to deliver goals, along with aligned R&Rs throughout
the organization.
4. SI Skills Set: The organization should carefully select the SIs, using an analytical
approach to define the "ideal" candidate, filling in knowledge/experience gaps as
required.
5. Support Structure: There must be a supporting structure and organization to allow
the transformation to a systems approach. Some examples of items that fall within
the support structure category are: Aligned performance reviews, sufficient
organizational authority for SIs to drive change, use of system level metrics,
development of needed system tools, desirable career path for SIs, and a mechanism
for sharing lessons learned amongst SIs.
Ongoing evaluations and modifications should be expected and are simply a part of continuous
improvement.
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CHAPTER 4
WHAT CAN OTHERS LEARN FROM ALPHA'S EXPERIENCE?
This thesis work began by recognizing a problem in a large scale product development firm
where system-level issues emerged at the interfaces, causing customer dissatisfaction, higher
product launch costs, and employee frustration, among other things. The engineering
organization was primarily focused on the component level performance, and their product
development process was not able to adequately deliver system level attributes.
Given the very nature of engineering as reductionist, it is plausible that many companies suffer
from these very same issues. In fact, they seem to exist, to varying extents, within most large
product development companies. Alpha's experience with introducing system integrators to
their component-focused engineering group can provide valuable insights and lessons to other
companies who are either beginning to introduce systems engineers or have already done so but
met with several problems along the way.
My work with Alpha has taught me that preparation is absolutely critical for a successful
introduction of systems engineers in a component-focused engineering organization. It is so easy
to see a problem and introduce a technical solution without taking the time to make sure the
solution is indeed addressing the root cause, and whether it will work with the extant culture.
Changing the focus of any large organization (in this case from component to system focused)
requires a shift in the culture and that takes a tremendous amount of time and dedication. The
road is not straight, nor well paved. But it is critical that the organization actually sees a need
and wants to migrate towards a systems approach. As a professor of mine noted, if a company
doesn't want a systems design process, then systems engineers aren't needed - it's like having a
quarterback if forward passing is illegal in football.**
Of the 5 key elements identified in Chapter 3, all of them should be completed before the actual
deployment of SIs, except for element #5, Supporting Structure, of which portions will evolve as
** Conversation with Dan Whitney, Senior Lecturer, MIT. 12/3/04.
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SIs are introduced. When you undertake such a dramatic change in an organization,
transforming from valuing the components' performance to the system's performance,
preparation is paramount. If you try and introduce such a shift in the status quo without proper
preparation, the culture will resist and ultimately triumph. Institutionalized change will not
occur.
If your organization plans to introduce SIs, make sure the following key elements are addressed:
1. Business Need: There must exist a business need, or "pull" for change, that is visible
at the macro and micro levels. The organization must see a need and want to migrate
to a systems approach.
2. Cultural Modification: There must be a recognized need for cultural change to
transition from component to systems thinking. A multi-pronged approach to modify
the culture is likely required.
3. SI Role Clarity - Defining the Process of System Optimization: There must be a
clearly defined process for SIs to deliver goals, along with aligned R&Rs throughout
the organization. A DFC analysis may prove helpful in understanding system
attribute delivery and aid in the development of a process. Make sure to clearly
define the system boundaries, and consider using a DSM to understand the current
flow of information within the organization.
4. SI Skills Set: The organization should carefully select the SIs, using an analytical
approach to define the "ideal" candidate, filling in knowledge/experience gaps as
required. Technical depth and breadth is required in the key components that are
involved in delivering system attributes. The DFC is useful in identifying the key
components. Note that SIs require both technical and soft skills to be effective. Their
soft skills include the ability to pull change within the organization, considering the
cultural landscape.
5. Support Structure: There must be a supporting structure and organization to allow
the transformation to a systems approach. The support structure is also needed for the
long-term sustainment of SIs. Some examples of items that fall within the support
structure category are: Aligned performance reviews, sufficient organizational
authority for SIs to drive change, use of system level metrics, development of needed
system tools, desirable career path for SIs, and a mechanism for sharing lessons
learned amongst SIs.
It takes an incredible amount of time and discipline to ensure all 5 elements are adequately
addressed, but the advantages of having a systems approach to engineering are tremendous. If
you can actually resolve the macro and micro level issues that currently plague your
organization, it might mean the difference between long-term success and bankruptcy. It may
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mean the difference between being a leader in the industry and a lagging follower. If you skip
the preparation steps and introduce systems engineers prematurely, you run the risk of causing
more damage than aid. If they are introduced half-heartedly, it will likely be more costly than
the status quo, and employees, both systems and functional engineers, will be frustrated with the
mixed signals.
With the ever-increasing push for more complex, highly integrated products, with shorter lead
times, the need for a systems approach will escalate for large engineering organizations. It may
not be the right time for your company to introduce systems engineers, but when the need arises,
take the time and energy to prepare for it properly. Ensure the 5 key elements are in place, and
you are likely to succeed.
_ _
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Topics for Further Research
While this thesis has attempted to answer many questions, even more remain. If time permitted,
I would investigate how other automotive companies deliver system level attributes, considering
their culture, processes, organizational and support structures. It would be interesting and
insightful to understand a different approach and its cascading influences in the design of a
vehicle.
In Alpha's case, I would pursue two areas for further study. First, I would investigate how the
micro-level pulls can be emphasized so that more engineers can see them. For instance, I do not
know if the performance objectives for the functional engineers and supervisors have changed
significantly since the SIs were introduced. If not, it is possible that aligning their objectives to
support the system engineering process would create a very strong pull.
However, Alpha needs to have a process first before they can align objectives, which leads to my
second area for further study. I would investigate how other companies have defined a new
process, and observe Alpha's efforts to do so. While my recommendations given on how to
define a process are (hopefully) useful, it has yet to be proven out as effective. Most likely,
there will be lessons learned along the way but that is an integral part of changing paths. Just ask
the trailblazer - he'll tell you all about it.
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APPENDIX A: List of typical questions asked during interviews
Typical questions asked in August/September 2003
Briefly describe your current job and previous work experience.
What is your role relative to closures and the systems integrator?
What do you see as the role of a systems integrator? What are their responsibilities? What's the
impact on you and your group? What are your hopes/fears relative to this new role? What does
Systems integration or systems engineering mean to you?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the level of integration between engineering &
manufacturing, where 10 means highly integrated (close knit) and 1 means they're completely
independent?
What groups will the SI need to coordinate with?
What problems do you think the SI will encounter?
Do you think it's advantageous or even necessary to have 2 integrators (one from engineering,
one from manufacturing)? Do you think 1 would be enough? Why? Would you think that a
single integrator should come from engineering, manufacturing, or somewhere else?
What skills would be necessary to be a successful integrator?
What do you see as the biggest challenges to the effectiveness of an SI?
What do you see as the biggest technical challenge for the SI?
What do you expect to change with the creation of this new integrator role? Do you see your
daily job responsibilities or effectiveness changing? Do you see the vehicle changing as a direct
result?
What long-standing problems do you think the SI will be able to readily address? What
tools/resources will they have that will make them more successful than previously?
Typical questions asked in January 2004
Why did you take the job?
Questionsfor Integrators:
How long have you been an integrator?
--
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What were your hopes/fears/expectations?
Have your hopes/expectations been met?
What' s been the reality of the job?
What is your typical day like? What are your typical activities?
To follow up on the last question, what do you think you SHOULD be doing as an
integrator? And why isn't that happening?
What is your relationship with other supervisors within closures? (Do you find they work
with you, against you, feel like you're intruding in their sandbox? Feel like your work is
welcomed or avoided? Do you guys work together? Seen as partners or just another
resource? )
What's the reaction (both yours and the supervisors) of the first among equals?
How do you think the other closures supervisors view the integrator role? Do they see
your role as a position that's meant to support them, or do they feel like they're supporting
you? Are they resentful, is there resistance? WHY?
Who do you see as your key interfaces?
What' s the relationship like with those groups?
What kind of support would you like from upper management? What do you need from
them?
How long do you expect to be in this job?
What's the question I should have asked that I didn't ask? What is it that I need to know
about that we haven't talked about?
Typical questions asked in May/June 2004
Questions for integrators:
Has it changed significantly since you began? How so?
Is the job what you thought it would be? If not, how is it different?
Do you generally like this job?
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Do you feel like you are making a difference in the vehicle, relative to other positions
you've had at [Alpha]?
Currently, what are the biggest hurdles for you as an SI?
What skills do you think are most important in being an effective SI?
Questionsfor mid-level managers:
How were the SIs selected?
What skills did you look for?
How were people selected? What were the criteria? What should they be?
For future hires, what skills/traits/characteristics will you look for in an SI?
Questionsfor everyone:
Think of an example of an obstacle or issue that an SI addressed in your closures department.
Tell me a bit about this example.
Did you feel like this was an issue that was well suited for a closures systems integrator?
What went well about the experience?
What areas of the issue could have been improved?
If you are an SI, do you feel like you have the proper support to do your job well? If not,
what is missing? If so, what's the critical pillar of support?
How do you think the prior organization at [Alpha] would have addressed this issue?
What, if anything, has changed the most about the [Alpha] culture or the way you do business at
[Alpha] since the inauguration of the SI?
Do you see the SI role as the "flavor of the month" or something that is here to stay?
What do others, either within or outside of your organization, think about the longevity and
importance of the SI role?
Do you think the SI has the organizational, cultural, and/or technical ability to improve the
quality of future vehicles? How so?
Is the SI the "first among equals"?
_____
83
Do you find the SI tech club meetings helpful? If not, how do you think they could be
improved? What is most helpful about the tech club meetings?
Any other open issues or items that someone should know about if they're trying to understand
the cultural, organizational, political and technical hurdles in front of SIs?
Any other people you recommend I talk with?
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APPENDIX B: Moti Frank's Research Summary
Moti Frank (1996???) researched the question, "what are the qualifications (knowledge, skills and aptitudes)
required from systems engineers?" Drawing upon 28 interviews, 14 lectures and 2 observation sites, Frank
identified 31 skills and 11 personal aptitudes required of a systems engineer. The skills that a systems engineer must
be capable of are:
* learning or analyzing the customer's or market's needs
* characterizing or preparing the initial requirements specifications
* Leading an applicability or feasibility study
* Preparing final requirements specifications
* "translating: the needs and requirements into technical specifications
* Describing the goal, objectives and uses of the required systems
* Defining and designing a Man-Machine Interface document
* Carrying out preliminary design of the system
* Defining or designing the system architecture
* Using systems design considerations
* Using tools designated for system design
* Characterizing, using and structuring simulations
* Integrating and combining experts of different disciplines
* Carrying out interface design
* Preparing or checking wiring and installations drawings
* Characterizing, designing or performing inspections, tests and integration runs
* Performing engineering optimization
* Performing economic optimization
* Checking (or writing) hardware, software and system development specifications
* Defining the system's boundaries
* Characterizing, defining, examining, testing or designing the system inputs and outputs
* Forecast or anticipate the long-term future
* Anticipating future modifications in the system and their implications
* Using economic and business considerations
* Regarding also non-engineering considerations
* Examining and suggesting considerations for integrating partners or sub-contractors
* Designing by standards
* Carrying out a design, compatible with different systems
* In defense industries - compatibility with commerce products and use of standard software tools and
platforms
* Using standard protocols or algorithms
* For those engaged in communication - familiarity with leading protocols
The "personal aptitudes" required from systems engineers, as found by Frank, are:
* Ability to work in a team
* Good human relations
* Auto-didactic capability
* Wishes to engage in systems topics
* Knows how to raise pertinent questions
* Does not get stuck in details
* Parallelism, analogy, transfer, relation and comparison between different discipline systems
* Knows what's what
* Evaluates different approaches on the way to the goal
* Creativity (lateral thinking, innovation, inquisitiveness, curiosity, imagination)
* Organizational and management capability (ability to activate and motivate people)
I_
